Legal Problems of Alcoholism by Tao, L. S.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 37 Issue 3 Article 5 
1969 
Legal Problems of Alcoholism 
L. S. Tao 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
L. S. Tao, Legal Problems of Alcoholism, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 405 (1969). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol37/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Legal Problems of Alcoholism 
Cover Page Footnote 
Andrew D. White Fellow and Candidate for J.S.D., Cornell University. Although the author's opinions are his 
own, he wishes to thank Profesor Kurt L. Hanslowe of Cornell Law School for his valuable suggestions. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol37/iss3/5 
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF ALCOHOLISM
L.S. TAO*
D ETERMINING the criminal responsibility of a chronic alcoholic is
essentially an interdisciplinary problem involving law, psychiatry,
and medicine, which seldom agree on solutions. Even within the legal
profession, there have been differing views on the applicability of certain
rules of criminal law to the offense of public drunkenness. Recently, the
United States Supreme Court has been criticized for having "retreated"
from the marked trend to establish a constitutional requirement of inens
rea in criminal cases.' Implied in this criticism, of course, is the view that
the offense of public drunkenness is a "general intent offense," 2 where
mens rea is an essential element. A similar point was made in Easter v.
District of Columbia3 when the court declared that "[o]ne who is a
chronic alcoholic cannot have the mens rea necessary to be held respon-
sible criminally for being drunk in public."4 The problem is not merely
semantic, but conceptual. As the court in Seattle v. Hill5 correctly pointed
out, all that commission of the offense of public intoxication requires is
defendant's "volitional control";0 hence, the defendant's mens rea is
simply irrelevant.
Although the notion that chronic alcoholism is a "disease" has the
necessary implication that it is the primary responsibility of the medical
profession to determine who is suffering from such a disease, the mere
finding of alcoholism does not seem to establish a defense to a criminal
conviction of public intoxication. This position is defensible because the
term "disease" in the case of alcoholism does not possess a sufficiently
definite meaning for legal application. Indeed, even medical experts have
not reached agreement as to the nature of alcoholic addiction.
This article attempts to identify and clarify the basic issues involved
in the offense of public drunkenness, to determine the relevance of
medical knowledge and to discuss some of the important problems arising
in connection with civil commitment of the alcoholic. The article will
* Andrew D. White Fellow and Candidate for J.D., Cornell University. Although the
author's opinions are his own, he wishes to thank Profesor Kurt L. Hansowe of Cornell
Law School for his valuable suggestions.
1. See Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 68-69 (196S).
2. Kirbens, Chronic Alcohol Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 54 A.BA .J. 877,
879-81 (1968).
3. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
4. Id. at 53.
5. 72 Wash. 2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cert. denied, 393 US. 872 (1968).
6. Id. at 789, 435 P.2d at 696.
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deal with the applicable rules of criminal law, and discuss the conflict of
perspectives between law and psychiatry. Finally, a principle will be
formulated for the determination of criminal responsibility of a public
drunkenness offender, and a solution will be suggested to the problems
concerning involuntary commitment of the problem drinker.
I. THE FOUNDATION OF RESPONSiBILITY
A. Mens Rea Versus Actus Reus-A Suggested Distinction
In the recent case of Powell v. Texas,7 a closely divided Court held
that Robinson v. California8 does not apply where criminal punishment is
imposed on an individual for a socially offensive act or behavior rather
than for being an alcohol addict. Justice Marshall, speaking for the
majority, ruled that Robinson stands only for the proposition that a
person cannot be punished for a "mere status."' In discussing the appli-
cable rules of criminal law concerning criminal responsibility, Justice
Marshall made only passing reference to actus reus. "The entire thrust
of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause," Marshall stated, "is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only
if the accused has committed some act . . . or perhaps in historical
common law terms, has committed some actus reus."'0
Powell would in many respects frustrate the recent trends toward
rehabilitative and therapeutic treatment of the chronic drunkenness of-
fenders in lieu of criminal punishment." Moreover, from the standpoint
of the ethical foundations of criminal liability, it also is significant that
the crime of public drunkenness is invariably one of strict liability, i.e.,
no showing of criminal mind or intent is necessary for conviction. 2 How-
ever, in a number of cases, mens rea has been the central issue upon
which the arguments and the decisions rested. This kind of controversy
over the existence of a mens rea can be avoided if the reason for the
doctrine of actus reus, which requires voluntariness" in criminal conduct,
even in strict liability offenses, is appreciated by the court.
7. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
8. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
9. 392 U.S. at 532.
10. Id. at 533.
11. See Kirbens, supra note 2; Murtagh, Status Offenses and Due Process of Law, 36
Fordham L. Rev. 51 (1967); Smith, Nonpenal Rehabilitation for the Chronic Alcoholic
Offender, 32 Fed. Prob. 46 (Sept. 1968).
12. See, e.g., Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933).
13. Voluntariness as used in this article denotes the actor's consciousness or awareness
of his physical conduct. It includes his consciousness of the material facts of the offenso
which he is committing, but excludes the situation where that minimum degree of awareness
is lacking. It does not reach the stage of knowing that the act is morally wrong, or that
it is socially harmful. The latter state of mind is within the scope of mens rea.
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In Driver v. Hinnant,4 the contention was raised that the public in-
toxication statute created an offense of strict liability in the sense that the
belief, intention or state of mind of the offender was immaterial or irrele-
vant and, hence, that proof of mens rea was not necessary. To this, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit answered that the
appellant's misbehavior cannot "be penalized as a transgression of a
police regulation-malum prohibitum-necessitating no intent to do
what it punishes. The alcoholic's presence in public is not his act, for he
did not will it. It may be likened to the movements of an imbecile or a
person in a delirium of a fever."' 5
There is, in criminal theory, a fundamental difference between the
voluntariness of an act and the inens rea of the actor. The former is an
element in actus reus, and the latter is a description of the actor's subjec-
tive mental state at the time of, or in relation to, the commission of the
act in issue.' This theoretical difference has practical significance. When
the court in Driver stated that the defendant's presence in public was not
his act because he did not will it, and analogized the situation to the
movements of an imbecile, it was stressing the involuntariness of the
defendant's act, which is like a causal happening not referrable to human
conduct.1' In short, the defendant was not responsible because his act
was not voluntary, and, since in the state of involuntariness actus reus
was lacking, such conduct can never be the basis for criminal liability.
At other points, however, the court in Driver seemed to emphasize the
defendant's lack of mens rea as the ground for reversing the conviction.
"Although his misdoing objectively comprises the physical elements of a
crime, nevertheless no crime has been perpetrated because the conduct
was neither actuated by an evil intent nor accompanied with a conscious-
ness of wrongdoing .... ," This statement reflects the view that lack of
mens rea is the same as lack of voluntariness. But the equation of lack
of mens rea with involuntariness, i.e., lack of actus reus, is not justified,
for involuntariness goes beyond lack of mens rea; it affects the question
of criminal liability at a more primary level.10 To illustrate: an inad-
vertent (hence lacking mens rea) act may be committed by a person yet
it may still be voluntary in the sense that the actor was aware of his own
14. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
15. Id. at 764.
16. Cf. Devlin, Statutory Offenses, 4 J. Soc'y Pub. Teachers of L. 206, 213 (1958).
17. See Hill v. Baxter, [1957] 1 Q.B. 277.
18. 356 F. 2d at 764. The use of the terms "evil intent" and "consciousness of wrong-
doing" demonstrates that the court was actually speaking of mens rea. See Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (Jackson, J.).
19. See, e.g., Jackson, Absolute Prohibition in Statutory Offenses, 6 Camb. L.J. 83 (1936).
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physical conduct.2 On the contrary, if a person under the compulsion of
a certain disease, e.g., schizophrenia, commits an act, he is not only with-
out mens rea, but also in a condition of involuntariness. The court in
Seattle v. Hill21 was correct in adhering to this fundamental distinction,
when it stated: "[H]is drunkenness was an offense malum prohibitum,
requiring no mens rea or evil design for conviction. If he possessed the
capability of avoiding public drunkenness, the other basic component,
that of actus reus, the volitional conduct, was thus present."2 2 Perhaps
this was also the point made by the Supreme Court in Powell, when it
insisted that Leroy Powell was able to control his act and capable of
refraining from being present in public after he had become drunk.23 The
distinction is of vital importance, since involuntariness or lack of actus
reus frees an individual from all criminal liability, including statutory
strict liability, while lack of mens rea does not exculpate him from such
liability.
B. Strict Liability for Public Intoxication
At present, most states make public drunkenness a criminal offense. 4
Although the material elements of the offense vary with the statutes,
drunkenness in public is usually the essential condition for conviction.
2 1
Invariably, however, no mens rea is required. A typical statute reads:
"Whoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any
public place, or at any private house except his own, shall be fined .... 12o
That no qualifications such as "knowingly" or "wilfully" are included in
the statute indicates that the public intoxication statute imposes strict
liability.27 Moreover, the nature of public drunkenness precludes a read-
ing of mens rea into the statutes, despite the common law principle that
in any statutory offense the mental element of mens rea is presumed to
be an essential ingredient unless the particular enactment expressly or
impliedly excludes it.25 The laws against public intoxication normally
define the offense in terms of status rather than conduct, thus impliedly
20. For a different interpretation of mens rea and voluntary conduct, see J. Hall,
General Principles of Criminal Law 114 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as J. Hall].
21. 72 Wash. 2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 872 (1968).
22. Id. at 794, 435 P.2d at 698.
23. 392 U.S. at 525.
24. President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society ch. 9, at 233-37 (1967) [hereinafter cited as President's
Comm'n].
25. For material elements of the offense of drunkenness, see 28 C.J.S. Drunkards
§§ 13-15 (1941).
26. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 477 (1952).
27. See Jackson, supra note 19, at 84-85.
28. See J. Hall at 41-45; Yahuda, Mens Rea in Statutory Offenses, 118 New L.J. 330
(1968).
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negating any common law mens rea requirement. Although Justices Mar-
shall and White attempted in Powell to interpret the offense in terms of
act or behavior,2 9 the obvious thrust of judicial interpretation has never-
theless been punishment of a personal condition or state of being, offen-
sive to the morals of the community.30 Moreover, if "mens rea includes
the state of knowing or believing, with reference to the material facts
and, also, the internal effort of intention, while criminal conduct is inens
rea manifested by a further effort evidenced in the production of a penal
harm, ' 3' the laws against drunkenness cannot possibly proscribe conduct
which is the product of a criminal mind.3 2 Indeed, it is usually impossible
to find a formed intention in the drunken offender to commit the offense.
The conclusion seems obvious. Whether the offense is called a Vialum
prohibitum,a or the physical movement of the offender in issue is referred
to as an act or behavior, the law penalizing public drunkenness creates an
offense of strict liability thus making mens rea immaterial.
C. Actus Reus
The definition of an offense usually describes a form of human conduct
in certain circumstances. Such conduct is not criminal unless it takes
place in these specified circumstances. Thus, behavior constituting
drunkenness is not a crime unless it is perpetrated in a public place. The
definition is often referred to as the actus reus of the offense. For a
majority of academic writers, actus reus represents a wider concept than
"act." This should be apparent as it is known that mere drunkenness
(an act) is not an offense unless the drunk appears in public (the combi-
nation of act and circumstance constituting the criminal actus reus). But
it is very important to note that, although a narrower concept, an act is
the basis of actus reus. Obviously, if there is no act of drunkenness, no
violation of the law can be asserted.
Consequently, the problem becomes one of determining the nature and
extent of "act" in the criminal law. It cannot be merely the physical
movements of a human being-for it is commonly known that something
more is required for the imposition of criminal punishment. Mental ill-
ness as a complete defense to a criminal charge is an apparent example,
among others.33 "[A] person should [not] be made liable at criminal law
29. 392 US. at 532, 550 n.2.
30. See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603
(1956).
31. J. Hall at 179.
32. Cf. Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. Cal. L. Rev. 463 (1967).
33. See People v. Hoy, 3 Mich. App. 666, 143 N.W.2d 577 (1966).
34. See J. Salmond, Jurisprudence § 128, at 383 (7th ed. 1924).
35. See N. Kerr, Inebriety or Narcomania, 610-11 (3d ed. 1894); Turner, The Mental
Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 Camb. L.J. 31 (1936).
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who through no fault of his own became unconscious while driving; for
example, if he were struck by a stone or overcome by a sudden illness, or
the car was temporarily out of control by his being attacked by a swarm
of bees."36 Taking notice of these practical situations, it seems that, in
the province of criminal law, an act implies and necessitates a mental
element in addition to external movement of the human body. A mere
causal happening which results in harm proscribed by law is not a crime,
nor is it a crime if the harm is committed by a person in absence of any
mental activity in relation to the bodily movement at the time. In the
latter situation, there is no act because there is no voluntariness, i.e., no
degree of consciousness of one's behavior or bodily movement.8 7 The
movements in this particular situation are commonly equated with a
natural happening for which the actor is not criminally responsible. The
function of actus reus is, therefore, to determine the imputability of a
certain act to the accused.
The requirement of mens rea in criminal law may also be interpreted
in such a way as to cover the situation just described. Indeed, this is
generally the reason put forward to justify the defense of mental disease.
"If the defendant was insane at the time of the conduct in issue, the
requisite mens rea was lacking and no crime was committed."", In a
majority of cases where the presence of a guilty mind is in dispute, it
makes no difference whether the subjective mental state of the offender is
designated as mens rea, or his conduct as voluntary. The result is the
same, since in these cases there can be no liability without mens rea.
However, the distinction between mens rea and voluntariness of conduct
becomes vitally important in connection with strict liability offenses. In
these offenses the requirement of mens rea is excluded, and proof of the
criminal conduct proscribed by the law is always sufficient for conviction.
As a result, criminal liability rests solely on actus reus30
To illustrate, it is useful to return to Driver and Powell. In the Driver
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit based its judgment
on the finding that the defendant, due to the disease of chronic alco-
holism, was totally unable to control his own behavior, and that, as a
result, his presence in public when drunk was without mens rea.Y' But the
element of mens rea was not required as an essential ingredient of the
offense by the North Carolina statute.4" Despite the above statement, the
court pointed out that the alcoholic's presence in public "is not his act,
36. Hill v. Baxter, [19571 1 Q.B. 277.
37. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.).
38. J. Hall at 449.
39. Yahuda, supra note 28.
40. See also Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
41. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-335 (1953).
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for he did not will it,"42 and analogized it to the movements of an im-
becile.43 This makes it abundantly clear that the judge treated this case
as one involving lack of voluntariness, i.e., actus reus was not proved,
though that term was not expressly used.
Justice Fortas, dissenting in Powell v. Texas, took the view that the
appellant's condition of public intoxication was occasioned by a compul-
sion symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism 4 and thus his
behavior lacked the critical element of mens rea4 But is vicns rea in the
offense of public intoxication under the Texas statute really a critical
element? A reading of the statute makes it crystal clear that it is not an
essential ingredient of the offense. What Justice Fortas was driving at, it
is suggested, was the point that the appellant, due to chronic alcoholism,
was incapable of controlling his behavior (public drunkenness) and that
there was, therefore, no voluntary act committed by him.4
In sum, the statutes forbidding public intoxication are regarded as im-
posing strict liability, hence only the existence of an appropriate actus
reus must be established. In Driver and Easter, the courts ruled that the
prosecutions had not done this. In neither case was it established beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant's act was a voluntary one. For that
reason, the convictions were reversed. In Powell and Hill, on the other
hand, the courts concluded that each appellant was unable to produce
sufficient evidence to show that he was under a compulsion which had
overcome his will power and made his acts uncontrollable. This was one
of the reasons why the convictions were sustained.
D. Determination of Criminal Responsibility
1. Basic Distinctions
It is commonly recognized that two or three drinks do not usually
produce significant drunkenness. Some inhibitions disappear but others
remain. Judgment and perception are not seriously impaired. All this is
true though sensibilities may be affected to a considerable degree. Save
in extreme cases, the drunken person is still aware of his behavior and
actions. Here, there is actus reus and, if proved, conviction is justified.
These physical circumstances underscore the great difference between
insanity and intoxication. Ordinarily, there is a choice between drinking
alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverages. Any choice carries with it responsi-
bility for the risks engendered by the choice, and the particular choice to
42. 356 F.2d at 764.
43. Id.
44. 392 US. at 554.
45. Id. at 554-55, 568.
46. Id. at 568.
1969]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
drink alcohol increases the risk of public drunkenness. 47 This is not so in
the case of insanity. It may be true that in some cases mental disease
may be the result of a great many unwise decisions over a period of time.
Nevertheless, one obviously cannot choose to be insane tomorrow in the
same way as one can elect tomorrow's drunkenness. This is precisely the
ground upon which judicial opinions rely.48 But there should be an excep-
tion: with the diseased, compulsive drinker, our judgment, moral or legal,
must be different. If drinking alcohol is compelled by disease, then there
is no more free choice than there is in the case of mental disease. Volun-
tariness cannot exist where there is no free choice. 49 Since in the absence
of voluntariness there is no actus reus, the diseased person is not respon-
sible for public drunkenness, even though his prior experience warns him
that consumption of alcohol will result in public intoxication. This as-
sumes, of course, that for most chronic alcoholics the consumption of
alcohol is involuntary 5 -- an assumption to be dealt with more carefully
in a subsequent section.
Leaving the extreme cases, there are middle groups of people who are
not under the compulsion of a disease or otherwise coerced to drink. In
this connection the question of prior experience becomes important. Dis-
tinctions can be made between normal offenders who had never pre-
viously experienced true drunkenness and those who have had such
experience.8" The inexperienced drunken offender seems not to be respon-
sible for his public intoxication, even though he voluntarily consumed
alcohol, because the public display of drunkenness was unexpected or
unavoidable-hence involuntary.52 Here, drinking alcohol and public
display of drunkenness are seen conceptually as two distinct matters.
Because his public intoxication is involuntary,53 the offender is not crimi-
nally liable by reason of lack of actus reus.
An experienced normal inebriate, on the other hand, raises a com-
pletely different problem. He is one who has been intoxicated and has
experienced loss of perception and control at least once, prior to the
behavior in question. Because of that previous experience he knows the
probable consequence of public intoxication when he consumes enough
47. See, e.g., Myerson & Mayer, Origins, Treatment and Destiny of Skid-Row Alcoholic
Men, 19 S.C.L. Rev. 332, 348 (1967).
48. People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E2d 799, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956); 1 F.
Wharton, Criminal Law § 66 (12th ed. 1932).
49. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 652-55 (1957).
go. See note 23 supra; S. Wallace, Skid Row as a Way of Life 179-90 (1965).
51. But the distinctions are meaningful only in the case where the person's public
drunkenness is committed involuntarily. The criminal liability for one whose public act
is performed with self-awareness is of little doubt.
52. If he has not lost his awareness, then criminal liability should follow; cf. Paris &
Great N.R.R. v. Robinson, 104 Tex. 482, 486, 140 S.W. 434, 436 (1911).
53. I.e., he is grossly intoxicated and not aware of the behavior in question. See Ramey
v. State, 151 S.E. 55 (Ga. App. 1929).
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alcohol. He knows that, once intoxicated, he would probably go out and
be found in a drunken condition in public. Although he is incapable of
volition when he is arrested, he anticipated that consequence and he
voluntarily assumed the conditions and state which led to his arrest. In
this situation, drinking and public intoxication are a natural sequence,
not only in terms of his behavior, but in terms of his knowledge and
awareness of the probable consequence. The public display of drunken-
ness is deemed voluntary, and for that reason, there is the necessary
actus reus.54
2. Involuntary Drinking of the Alcoholic
With chronic alcoholics, the question of free choice at the time of con-
suming alcohol is very important. Once it is decided that there is no free
course open to the alcoholic other than to drink intoxicating liquors,
criminal responsibility is eliminated irrespective of whether, subse-
quently, he is aware of his public display of intoxication. The reason for
this rule has been explained in a case dealing with the doctrine of actus
reus:
[A]ltogether apart from the mental element of intention or knowledge of the cir-
cumstances, a person cannot be made criminally responsible for an act or omission
unless it was done or omitted in circumstances where there was some other course
open to him. If this condition is absent, any act or omission must be involuntary, or
unconscious, or unrelated to the forbidden event in any causal sense regarded by the
law as involving responsibility. 55
Prerequisite to the finding of the existence of any "free course" open to
the alcoholic is, of course, understanding the nature of alcoholic addic-
tion. It is generally recognized that alcoholic addiction manifests itself in
two ways which are relevant to the determination of the individual's
responsibility: (1) An addict is unable to prevent himself from drinking,
and (2) once he begins to drink he is unable to stop until intoxicated.50
However, the question of the degree of the person's inability to abstain
from drinking or continuing to drink is a difficult one. To say that the
alcoholic drinks "in a very special way-that is, to excess, compulsively
without control, and self-destructively"17 does not provide a definite
guideline to distinguish the diseased alcoholic from the normal excessive
drinker. The criterion, if any, must be found in medical knowledge about
alcoholism.
Two characteristic conditions distinguish the alcoholic from the normal
drinker. The first is his physical dependence on alcohol. Indicative of
this dependence is the distressing withdrawal symptoms which provoke
the person to seek relief from them by the use of more alcohol. The
54. See, e.g., State v. Sevier, 117 Ind. 338, 20 N.E. 245 (1889).
55. Kilbride v. Lake [1962] NZ..L.R 590, 593 (1961).
56. See references cited in Powell v. Texas, 392 US. 514, 522 (1968).
57. Vogel, Psychiatric Treatment of Alcoholism, 315 Annals 99, 100 (1958).
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second is his psychological craving for alcohol, as reflected in the "build-
ing up of psychological tension which provokes a 'pathological desire'
for alcohol as a means of relieving this tension .... ,,68 Conceivably, proof
of the alcoholic's physical dependence would be easier and, in most cases,
more convincing than a showing of his psychological craving. However,
both must exist to make an individual alcoholic.
The alcoholic's physical dependence on alcohol is "directly related to
initial, reversible effects of the alcohol on the molecular orientation of
specific cell membranes, associated with secondary effects on ion shifts
and other intracellular equilibria."5 0 Following the chronic intrusion of
alcohol molecules into the neuronal membranes, certain intracellular
chemical changes occur which relate to "adaptation" or "tolerance." At
the same time, the structure of the cell and of the membranes is altered.
If, subsequent to these changes in structure, alcohol is withdrawn, "it
would not be at all surprising to expect a violent reaction leading to
destruction of new equilibria and instability of excitable structures.""0
Addiction represents a continuing need for alcohol to maintain the new
steady state level of the cell. "Withdrawal symptoms might then be the
acute result of loss of the new steady state."0 1 Withdrawal symptoms
indicate and provide strong proof of one's completion of the "new steady
state" in the body. Lack of such symptoms, on the other hand, will evince
that the person has not become medically "addicted." Therefore, the
person not completely "addicted" to alcohol, in the sense that no serious
physical dependence on alcohol is shown, has not lost the physical power
to abstain from drinking more alcohol when it is necessary to exercise
that power. In short, he has not lost the free course open to him, because,
if necessary, he could still stop drinking.
This is precisely the point emphasized in Powell v. Texasu2 and Seattle
v. Hill,63 where convictions of public drunkenness were sustained. In
Powell, Justice Marshall observed that "Jellinek asserts that it cannot
accurately be said that a person is truly unable to abstain from drinking
unless he is suffering the physical symptoms of withdrawal. There is no
testimony in this record that Leroy Powell underwent withdrawal symp-
toms either before he began the drinking spree which resulted in the
conviction under review here, or at any other time. '0 4 In Hill, in reliance
58. Alcohol and Alcoholism, Rep. of an Expert Comm., 94 World Health Tcchn. Rep.
Ser. 6 (1955).
59. R. Grenell, Some Effects of Alcohol on the Central Nervous System, in Alcoholism:
Basic Aspects and Treatment 7-8 (H. Himwich ed. 1957).
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id.
62. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
63. 72 Wash. 2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 872 (1968).
64. 392 U.S. at 525.
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on the testimony of a medical expert that he was unable to find symptoms
of physical dependence on alcohol in the defendant, 5 Judge Hale found
that there were neither physical signs of alcoholism in the defendant nor
a psychological compulsion in him to drink."" As a result, the court was
not convinced that there was no alternative course open to the defendant
other than to consume alcohol.
It seems clear that the medical knowledge of alcoholism must be fitted
into the existing legal framework in order to be useful. To say that a
person is caught in the dilemma of the problem of excessive drinking is
one thing; but to prove in court that because of the "disease" he has lost
control over his drinking of alcohol is quite another. The basic issue in
the case of the chronic alcoholic is whether he has free choice, or volun-
tariness of conduct, in taking the drinks which lead to his public intoxica-
tion. A definite standard upon which to decide the issue is necessary. It
would be desirable if law and medicine could make a common effort in
that direction.
3. A Suggested Principle
In all the cases just discussed, medical testimony was relevant to the
decisions to the extent that it could show (1) whether the defendant was
an alcoholic, and (2) what degree of drunkenness the defendant had
reached. Medical testimony in this regard thus contributes to determining
the existence of the "drunkenness" and "voluntariness" required by the
statutes.67 Consequently, criminal responsibility should follow in cases of
normal offenders (nonalcoholics), experienced or not, whose state of
intoxication has not deprived them of their awareness of the drunken
behavior they exhibit. As to experienced normal offenders, liability should
arise even though a public display of drunkenness is without awareness
or self-control to the degree of involuntariness.
The preceding analysis gives rise to the following principles: (A) In
all cases the degree of intoxication and the extent of sense impairment
must be investigated. Except in extreme cases, all normal offenders are
criminally responsible if in the state of public intoxication the perception
or awareness of the behavior at issue does not disappear. (B) Where
intoxication is to such a degree that perception is lost: (1) Normal
drinkers with prior experience of intoxication are criminally liable for
public drunkenness if, having become intoxicated, they display drunken-
ness in public as proscribed by the law. (2) Normal drinkers who have
had no previous experience with consuming alcohol or intoxication, and
who have no reason to anticipate loss of self-control in public after drink-
65. 72 Wash. 2d at 790, 435 P.2d at 696.
66. Id. at 794, 435 P.2d at 698.
67. See Robinson v. California, 370 US. 660 (1962).
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ing, are not responsible if they become intoxicated and display drunken-
ness in public. (3) Chronic alcoholics are not responsible for public
drunkenness, provided that it can be established that their consumption
of alcohol is compelled by disease. The test of criminal responsibility is
based upon the general doctrine of actus reus. In (A) and (B) (1) there
is actus reus, while in the other situations there is none.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF PSYCHIATRY
Much of the present confusion about the criminal responsibility of the
public drunkenness offender and, particularly, the chronic alcoholic,
stems from Robinson, where the Supreme Court announced the proposi-
tion that disease should not be subjected to criminal sanctions. According
to the Robinson rule, to declare a sick person a criminal violates con-
stitutional safeguards against cruel and unusual punishment. The rele-
vant statement is dictum:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it a
criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a
venereal disease .... But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law
which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally
thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
* , " Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the
"crime" of having a common cold.0 8
The assumption is obvious that there is a dichotomy between the criminal
responsibility of the normal and that of the ill, and, presumably, the
dividing line must be drawn by the medical profession.
A. Alcoholism as a Disease
Shortly after Robinson, the American Medical Association and the
American Psychiatric Association adopted position statements to the
effect that alcoholism is an illness and is entitled to whatever treatment
is available. 9 These statements, coupled with a similar announcement by
the World Health Organization, have been regarded as persuasive by
some courts. The court in Driver, for example, in following the Robinson
dictum that disease cannot be made criminal, relied heavily upon the idea
that alcoholism is a disease.70 Consequently, it becomes important to
know when the medical profession designates alcoholism as a disease and
what meaning is attached to that idea.
In general, the idea of disease connotes any disequilibrium among an
68. Id. at 666.
69. In Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966), these official statements were
carefully recorded and documented. See also Smith, Psychiatric Treatment of the Alcoholic,
Manual on Alcoholism 53 (A.M.A. 1957); 197 J.A.M.A. 582 (1966) (editorial).
70. 356 F.2d at 763-64.
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individual's component parts.71 This, however, is obviously not what the
medical societies, such as the National Council on Alcoholism and the
American Psychiatric Association, meant by calling alcoholism a dis-
ease.72 For example, the World Health Organization announced that:
"Alcoholics are those excessive drinkers whose dependence upon alcohol
has attained such a degree that it shows a noticeable mental disturbance
or an interference with their bodily and mental health, their interpersonal
relations, and their smooth social and economic functioning, or who show
the prodromal signs of such developments. 73 Undoubtedly, it refers to
the uncontrolled, apparently compulsive and self-harming characteristics
of the alcoholic's drinking patterns.
Most observers tend to explain the phenomenon of alcoholism in
psychiatric terms. The Freudians have attributed alcoholism to one of
three unconscious tendencies: self-destructive urges, oral fixation, and
latent homosexuality.74 The Adlerians have explained alcoholism as a
striving for power, a reaction to a pervasive feeling of inferiority.75 The
interpersonal psychologists believe that the disease may be a response to
a number of different motives, but most commonly to a suppressed con-
flict between dependent drives and aggressive urges. 71 Many psychiatrists
claim that they frequently find in alcoholics certain personality character-
istics, such as emotional dependency, immaturity, and low tolerance for
anxiety and frustrations.77 The difficulty with such analyses is the fact
that most individuals with these traits who consult psychiatrists are not
alcoholics. In other words, while a few people may be predestined to
become alcoholics, psychological predestination is not an adequate ex-
planation for most alcoholism. Moreover, psychiatrists have occasion to
see only a small number of the estimated six million alcoholics. Normally,
they draw their evidence from the analysis of post-hoc samples-alco-
holics who have already been committed to mental hospitals or who have
71. See definition of disease in Blakiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary (1956). See
also M. Jahoda, Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health (1958); French, Kaln &
Mann, Work, Health and Satisfaction, 18 J. Soc. Issues, No. 3 (1926).
72. See Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations 91 (4th ed. R. Plunkett
1952); cf. Comm. on Nomenclature and Statistics, Am. Psych. A.s'n, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1952).
73. Mental Health, 2d Rep. of Expert Comm., Alcoholism Subcomm., 48 World Health
Tecbn. Rep. Ser. (1952).
74. See, e.g., K. Menninger, Man Against Imself 149 (1938); Loll, Alcoholism as a
Disorder of the Love Disposition, 17 QJ. Studies on Alcohol 96 (1956).
75. See, e.g., H. Ansbacher & P. Ansbacher, The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler
423 (1956).
76. See, e.g., R. White, The Abnormal Personality 417 (1948).
77. Selber, Psychodynamic Therapy, Proc. of N. Am. Ass'n of Alcohol Programs Syrnp.
(1965).
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already approached clinics for psychotherapy. Since most alcoholics con-
ceal their drinking problems, the number of them observed by the clinic
psychiatrists is small. As a result, there seems no sufficiently sound basis
on which to decide whether certain personality traits are the cause or
result of excessive drinking.
Naming alcoholism a disease which, in light of present medical knowl-
edge, is necessarily a determination of social policy, has the effect of
making problem drinking a topic for systematic study rather than a
moral issue.7 But, in the absence of a general consensus among the
psychiatrists and other experts on the pathology and mental conditions of
alcoholism, the designation of alcoholism as an illness does not provide
an authoritative basis on which courts may rely. A disease, after all, may
be any disability which the public and, particularly, the medical pro-
fession agree is a disease.79 However, the implication that any diseased
condition should be the primary responsibility of the medical profession
makes it necessary to inquire into precisely what is meant by the medical
profession when it calls alcoholism a disease.
Most psychiatrists consider alcoholism a form of mental disease. 0
Since, in psychiatry, laboratory evidence contributes little to demon-
strating objectively specific pathological signs, diagnosis becomes a func-
tion of the skill, experience and theoretical orientation of the diagnosti-
cian.8 ' Consequently, few experts have offered clear-cut criteria for
definining alcoholism. 2 Whatever definition is usually made appears in
terms of "health" or "normality," i.e., disease described as an opposite
to health. 3 When used in court, criteria stated in terms of illness or
health are subject to value judgements by judge, jury or psychiatrist as
to what is normal or abnormal without any standards for decision.8 ' Since
78. "[A] disease is what the medical profession recognizes as such." E. Jelilnek, The
Disease Concept of Alcoholism 12 (1960). See also Seeley, Alcoholism Is a Disease: Im-
plications for Social Policy, in Society, Culture and Drinking Patterns 586 (1962).
79. Id. See also Parsons, Illness and the Role of the Physician: A Sociological Perspective,
21 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 452 (1951).
80. Diethehn, Report of Section on Psychiatric Research, 16 Q.J. Studies on Alcohol
565-74 (1955); Keller, Definition of Alcoholism, 21 Q.J. Studies on Alcohol 125 (1960);
cf. Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. Pa. L. Rov.
378, 384 (1952).
81. See A. Hollingshead & F. Redlich, Social Class and Mental Illness 155-57 (1953);
Knight, A Critique of the Present Status of Psychotherapies, 25 Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med.
100 (1949).
82. See Milbank Memorial Fund Papers, Interrelations Between the Social Environ-
ment and Psychiatric Disorders (1953); Lewis, Health as a Social Concept, 4 Brit. J.
Sociol. 109 (1953).
83. Redlich, The Concept of Health in Psychiatry, in Explorations in Social Psychiatry
138, 139 (A. Leighton, J. Clausen & R. Wilson eds. 1957).
84. Cf. Swartz, "Mental Disease": The Groundwork for Legal Analysis and Legislative
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psychiatry cannot demonstrate by pathology that a given person has been
under such compulsion as to be unable to control his behavior, it becomes
difficult for the court to see him as sick and accept the view that he does
not have the power to avoid public drunkenness. 85
Indeed, certain medical authorities believe that it is an habituation!'
To say that addiction is "habituation to some practice"' 87 has important
legal implications. A habit is not necessarily a disease, and a bad habit
will not excuse one from criminal responsibility. 8 Some sociologists, on
the other hand, tend to view alcoholism in terms of differential associa-
tion and the role theory.8 9 Their premise is that behavior is learned and
the compulsive act is "motivated" through social interactions. Disease
cannot be learned. Thus, the sociological interpretation is not quite con-
sistent with the commonly accepted view of disease.
In short, to call alcoholism a disease, or to name a public drunkenness
offender a sick person, though having the implication that the medical
profession should assume primary responsibility for the ultimate solution
to the problem, does not constitute sufficient legal basis for exculpating
the person from criminal liability. The fundamental issue is whether or
not he had free choice in his behavior in question, in the sense that he
was aware of his own conduct and the material facts of the offense. If
the offender did not have such a degree of voluntariness as required by
the criminal law, no criminal sanction should be imposed on him. Crimi-
nal liability can better be eliminated by the doctrine of actus reus, than
by simply denoting alcoholism a disease.
B. The Need for a Theoretical Ground
Undoubtedly, medical science, particularly psychiatry, has much to
offer in the improvement of the law and its administration. 0 The problem
is to establish a sound theoretical basis on which medicine and legal
science can work harmoniously. Apparently, this is a difficult problem;
Action, Ill U. Pa. L. Rev. 389, 391 (1963); Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, IS Am.
Psychologist 113 (1960).
85. Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wash. 2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cerL denied, 393 US. 872
(1968).
86. Reinert, The Concept of Alcoholism as a Bad Habit, 32 Menninger Clinic Bull 35
(1968) ; Reinert, Alcoholism: Disease or Habit?, 32 Fed. Prob. 12 (March 1968).
87. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 26 (21st ed. 1966).
88. In Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wash. 2d 786, 793, 435 P2d 692, 698 (1967), cert. denied, 393
US. 872 (1968), the court said that the defendant "acknowledged that drinking 'is kind of a
pastime and a habit'; that he did not feel compelled to drink .... .
89. Cressey, The Differential Association Theory and Compulsive Crimes, in Crime
and Insanity 49 (R. Nice ed. 1958).
90. See President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task
Force Report: Drunkenness (1967).
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but difficult as it may seem, it can nevertheless be achieved by coopera-
tive efforts of the professions and the disciplines concerned. The principal
barrier at present seems to be a lack of understanding of the grounds on
which psychiatry and law can meet to solve the problems in dealing with
the offense of public drunkenness.
1. Differences in Perspectives
Every branch of science rests upon certain axioms or postulates which
are accepted by experts in the field. Basically, psychiatry is preoccupied
with the origin, growth, development, and ultimate expression of cer-
tain deep human drives in particular individuals. Sex and aggression
are seen as innate biological forces which undergo an incredibly varied
series of transformations before they manifest themselves in their adult,
mature forms. Detrimental influences may affect the development of
these biological forces. If noxious influences are not overcome, psy-
chopathy results. The symptoms of the resultant psychopathical state
appear as consequences of the dynamic interaction between pathological
drives and defenses of the ego.0 1 In sum, psychiatry may express itself in
terms of drives and dispositions which operate in accordance with certain
universal laws of causation. The alcoholic person's mind is believed to be
subject to casual emotional experiences, especially early sexual experi-
ences, which may completely determine the person's choice about drink-
ing at a given momentf2
The law, on the other hand, asserts the reality of free choice and
rejects the thesis that the conduct of a normal adult is a mere expression
of psychological necessityf 3 Indeed, the recognition of a certain degree
of free will or autonomy is a necessary postulate of criminal law. The
concept of responsibility is derived from that postulate. 4
The differences in perspective are reflected in the fundamentally dif-
ferent conception of and approach to punishment. Thus, sociologists
conceive of punishment as group vengeance, and psychiatrists view it as a
sanction serving emotional needs of the public. 5 But from the perspec-
tive of law, punishment signifies accountability of the person who volun-
tarily chooses to do the act proscribed by law. To a great extent, it
reflects a moral judgment, that a normal person who voluntarily commits
91. K. Homey, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (1937); Diamond, The Simula-
tion of Sanity, 2 J. Social Therapy 158 (1956).
92. See note 75 supra.
93. See E. Sutherland & D. Cressey, Principles of Criminology 52-53 (6th ed. 1960);
Mueller, The Public Law of Wrongs-Its Concepts in the World of Reality, 10 J. Pub. L
203, 231-32 (1961).
94. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 526 (1968).
95. See, e.g., D. Abrahamsen, Who Are the Guilty? 288 (1952).
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a socially harmful act is wrong and therefore culpable.0 In this view,
punishment serves the public good by giving concrete effect to the com-
munity's standards of right and wrong through incapacitation of the
convicted harm-doer and, possibly, by facilitating rehabilitation T Punish-
ment is therefore a corollary of responsibility, based upon the concept of
man as capable, within limits, of making choices. Consequently, if human
beings are in any degree free moral agents, treatment cannot be wholly
substituted for punishment. It would not be justified, even on humani-
tarian grounds, to treat all criminals as sick personsf s Pragmatically, the
law may work in remedial ways although it is not institutionally designed
for this purpose. The first question to be determined, however, is who
shall be subjected to the control of the state, and who shall remain free
from state intervention. 9 Criminal responsibility is the primary test to
determine these questions. Once it is decided that a person is criminally
liable, the second question will then be: What kind of control shall be
exercised by the state? This inquiry goes to the social interpretation of
punishment, and asks whether punishment or treatment is a more de-
sirable way of dealing with the drunkenness offender.10
C. The Role of Psychiatry in Administration of Law
One serious difficulty in connection with the drunkenness offender is
the short duration of time within which the state can exercise a com-
pulsory measure of treatment or rehabilitation. The shortness and diver-
sity of sentences not only lacks deterrent effect, but precludes the
possibility of treatment even if there were the desire and knowledge to
treat the drunk. 0 1 It is clear that serious difficulties concerning the use
of medical knowledge arises from the limitations of penal institutions and
the lack of resources to provide adequate medical, and particularly, psy-
chiatric services. This is one area in which medical experts and lawyers
can join in common effort, without engaging in futile disputes as to what
is alcoholism.
If no definition of "alcoholism" is provided, it would be undesirable,
and indeed entirely unjustified, to abandon the rules of the law which at
least offer some definite standards upon which the court can decide the
96. See J. Hall, ch. 3.
97. See generally E. Sutherland & D. Cressey, supra note 93.
98. See Davidson, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Responsibility, in Crime and
Insanity, 29, 45-46 (R. Nice ed. 1958).
99. See J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 173
(1879); JS. MMI, On Liberty 213, 230 (World Pub. Co. ed. 1962).
100. See S. Rubin, Psychiatry and Criminal Law (1965).
101. MacCormick, Correctional Views on Alcohol, Alcoholism and Crime, 9 Crime &
Delinquency 15 (1963).
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responsibility of a drunkenness offender. Rather, medical experts can
assist the courts in deciding whether or not a given act or conduct is
voluntarily committed by the accused.
III. CIvI COMMITMENT
The problem of providing medical treatment for chronic drunks is at
least twofold. On one hand, there is the technical problem of adequate
psychological and psychiatric knowledge and skill required for successful
treatment and rehabilitation of alcoholics and habitual drunks. This, of
course, can be better achieved if the individual desires to accept such
treatment. 10 2 The second problem is how and whether unwilling people
should be brought to treatment. Should an individual who habitually
takes alcohol be allowed to do so as a matter of right so long as he does
not do it in public or does not disturb other individuals? This is a difficult
question. If society interferes with such individual acts, should not the
intervention be extended to other habits of addictive nature (such as
cigarette smoking) which are deemed harmful to health? Where is the
line to be drawn dividing matters of legitimate public intervention from
matters that are merely personal? 10
3
Although the statutes dealing with public drunkenness are punitive in
nature and not remedial, it is conceivable that, through administration
of the punitive aspects of such laws, remedial help may be afforded
chronic alcoholic offenders. One method would be to provide medical, and
particularly, psychiatric services in penal institutions housing alco-
holics.104
As a matter of policy, a judicial re-interpretation of the statutes, which
would require dangerous or disorderly conduct to be an ingredient of the
offense, would seem desirable. 105 Under this proposed definition of the
offense, a great number of people might be intoxicated in public without
violating the statutes. For these people, some new procedure of detention
and treatment would seem necessary. This requires establishment of a
102. Due to the intense hostility of the alcoholics, compulsory treatment is believed
to be the only way to bring the majority of alcoholics into treatment. Seizer, Hostility as a
Barrier to Therapy in Alcoholism, 31 Psychiatry Q. 301, 305 (1957); Seizer, On Involuntary
Hospitalization for Alcoholics, 19 Q.J. Studies on Alcohol, 660 (1958).
103. More complicated is the fact that the law punishes intoxication in a public place
and does not purport to deal with private drinking or drunkenness. Experience accumulated
in the Prohibition Era teaches us that alcohol consumption in general society cannot be
eradicated by punitive or legal measures. If drinking alcohol is not to be controlled by the
law, how can the problems raised in public drunkenness be ultimately solved?
104. See President's Comm'n. See also Murtagh, Arrests for Public Intoxication, 35
Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1966).
105. See Judge Murtagh's discussion of the law in New York City. ABA Section on
Criminal L. 67-68 (1960).
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civil commitment program. However, save in cases of voluntary and
willing hospitalization, compulsory commitment of drunks and alcoholics
inevitably raises various constitutional problems.' 00
A. Legal Problems
After expressing serious doubts on the law treating drunkenness alone
as a crime, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice recommended establishment of a civil commitment
procedure under which an alcoholic could be committed to a detoxifica-
tion center for detention and treatment.10 7 The Commission realized that
one of the difficult obstacles to a change in existing law is that "there
presently are no clear alternatives for taking into custody and treating
those who are now arrested as drunks."'0 8 Nevertheless, they believe that
"current efforts to find such alternatives to treatment within the criminal
system should be expanded."'1 9 If adequate health facilities are de-
veloped, it would be desirable to enact civil legislation authorizing the
police "to pick up those drunks who refuse to or are unable to cooper-
ate ... .",910 In other words, a compulsory procedure of civil commitment
is contemplated. "Such legislation could expressly sanction a period of
detention and allow the individual to be released from a public health
facility only when he is sober." ''
In 1962, the use of civil commitment program for narcotic addicts was
suggested by the majority of the Supreme Court in Robinson. Justice
Stewart, speaking for the Court, said that "In the interest of discouraging
the violation of such laws, or in the interest of the general health or
welfare of its inhabitants, a state might establish a program of com-
pulsory treatment for those addicted to narcotics. Such a program of
treatment might require periods of involuntary confinement. And penal
sanctions might be imposed for failure to comply with established com-
pulsory treatment procedures. 1" 2 This statement could be interpreted to
cover two different commitment procedures. The first would be com-
pulsory hospitalization of the alcoholic who is not responsible for the
offense of drunkenness because of the disease. The second would be civil
commitment of the drunk who has not violated the criminal law. A care-
106. See Note, Civil Commitment of Narcotics Addicts, 76 Yale L.J. 1160 (1967).
107. See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law art. 10 (Supp. 1968).
108. President's Comm'n at 235.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 370 U.S. 660, 664-65.
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ful analysis would show that it is more likely that the Court was referring
to the second procedure.1 3
As the courts in Driver and Easter followed the major theme of Robin-
son, they adopted the same position in relation to this problem and ex-
pressed the belief that compulsory commitment procedure would be
necessary and appropriate to cope with chronic alcoholics. The Driver
court, for example, stated: "the State cannot stamp an unpretending
chronic alcoholic as a criminal if his drunken public display is involun-
tary as the result of disease. However, nothing we have said precludes
appropriate detention of him for treatment and rehabilitation so long as
he is not marked a criminal.""' 4 Given the facts in the case, however, it
seems that the court was suggesting a procedure of compulsory commit-
ment of those who have violated the law but are acquitted by reason of
involuntary drinking due to the disease of alcoholism.
In reaching its conclusion, the Driver court said Robinson "sustains, if
not commands, the view we take.""' 5 However, a thorough analysis of the
Robinson opinion reveals that the court misplaced its reliance. In regard
to the question of criminal responsibility, Robinson only proscribed the
punishment of the status of narcotic addiction; it did not even purport to
cover any act of the addict. Driver extended this immunity to acts which,
according to the court, are symptoms of chronic alcoholism. Strictly con-
struing Robinson, this would seem to be an unfounded extension of the
language of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the basic issues in the two
cases were not entirely identical. Robinson was concerned with a situa-
tion where the defendant did not commit a criminal act. Driver, on the
other hand, dealt with the alleged acts or behavior of the defendant
which were not voluntary. But voluntary or not, it was overt behavior.
Since Robinson standing alone is inapplicable to situations involving an
act or behavior, it appears doubtful that it either sustains or commands
the result in Driver.
More importantly, to follow the dictum in connection with civil
commitment procedure in Robinson seems even more unjustified. The
Robinson dictum on civil commitment was not supported by any prior
decisions. Justice Douglas, concurring, stated, "The addict is a sick
person. He may, of course, be confined for treatment or for the protection
of society."" 6 Thus, Driver was following the dictum of a Supreme Court
113. E.g., Williams v. United States, 312 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
982 (1965).
114. 356 F2d at 765.
115. Id. at 764.
116. 370 U.S. at 676 (citation omitted).
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decision which was unsupported by precedent and which was in fact
inapplicable to the case.
The practical aspect of civil commitment should not be ignored. If the
orderly alcoholic is confined until cured or rehabilitated, he will often
serve a "sentence" which would exceed the term he would have served in
jail under current statutes. He might even be confined in an institution
indefinitely. Many medical authorities believe chronic alcoholism is very
difficult to cure, or in extreme cases, incurable.11 7 Moreover, since this
confinement, as the President's Commission recommends, 118 could be
accomplished in a "civil" proceeding, the courts would also have to deter-
mine if the "restrained" alcoholic is to be afforded the constitutional
safeguards granted defendants in criminal trials."' It will be difficult to
justify long-term confinement solely on the ground of illness, in the
absence of a criminal act by the individual:
B. Legal Basis of Civil Commitment Program
The "traditional" civil commitments in use today are quarantine of
those with contagious diseases and commitment of incompetents. For
both of these, the power of the state is derived from two related, specific
and well-recognized legal doctrines. The first is the concept of parens
patriae, the sovereign's power of guardianship over persons under dis-
ability. The second is the state's police power. The standards are usually
a person's danger, either to himself or others, or his need for treatment
and protection. 20 Statutes set up the class of persons who are commit-
table.'21 A proceeding usually must be held to determine that the condi-
tion of the particular individual meets the statutory criteria. As a result,
e.g., though many insane people are committable, not all of the mentally
ill are,122 for either dangerousness or helplessness must be found.
The President's Commission, under the proposed definition of the of-
117. See Logan, Alcoholism-A Legal Problem?, 36 Dicta 446 (1959).
118. President's Comm'n.
119. For example, in Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n v. James, 22 N.Y.2d 545, 240
N.E2d 29, 293 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1968) the court struck down as unconstitutional the pro-
cedure authorized by New York law for the civil commitment of addicts. Cf. Specht v.
Patterson, 386 US. 605 (1967) where in a dictum the court noted that "commitment
proceedings whether denominated civil or criminal are subject both to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... and to the Due Process Clause." Id. at 603
(citation omitted). See also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); People v. Bailey, 21
N.Y.2d 588, 237 N.E.2d 205, 289 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1968); In re Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 173
N.E.2d 797, 213 N.YS.2d 74 (1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.. 34 (1961).
120. See Williams v. United States, 312 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Note, supra note 106.
121. See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 301 (Supp. 1968).
122. See 1. Goldstein, J. Katz & A. Dershowitz, Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law
460-89 (1967).
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fense,' 2' would still subject drunkenness accompanied by disorderly con-
duct, or intoxication manifesting danger to the person or to the com-
munity, to criminal sanction. Only those drunks who are not dangerous
or disorderly are thought to be suitable subjects for compulsory civil
commitment. The police would have no power to charge a drunk sitting
in a park with public drunkenness (assuming he is neither disorderly nor
dangerous), but would have the authority to take the person to a detoxifi-
cation center where he could be detained against his will for a period of
time. The legal ground for this civil commitment would be the doctrine
of parens patriae, under which a finding that the alcoholic was helpless
would justify involuntary commitment. Because there is no precise medi-
cal definition of alcoholism accepted by the courts, no automatic equa-
tion is as yet possible between alcoholism and the helplessness which
permits utilization of pareni patriae. The absence of such definition
creates the danger that a "spree drinker' 1 24 might be committed as an
alcoholic.
There are further difficulties with compulsory commitment of the pub-
lic drunkenness offender whose criminal liability is established, and who,
in medical judgment, is sick and needs treatment. Here the commitment
is called "civil" only to enable the state to deal with him in procedures
other than criminal. Nonetheless, the criterion is usually the criminal act,
rather than the tests of dangerousness or helplessness. This kind of com-
mitment is based upon two questionable assumptions: that there is ade-
quate medical knowledge and skill to cure habitual, excessive drinking,
and that commitment in a medical institution would lessen or avoid the
stigma attached to imprisonment. 25
C. Toward a Solution
Not all the recommendations of the President's Commission in dealing
with the drunkenness offender are without practical value. The most
sensible suggestion is to take the offender to a detention center rather
than to a police station. If no charge is made against him (e.g., he is
drunk but not disorderly), he should either be taken home or, if he has
no place to go, be kept in the center until, and only until, he sobers up.
Medical and psychiatric services should be made available to persons
detained in such a center. It is, of course, not possible to facilitate any
treatment within this very short span of time, but an initial diagnosis
123. See President's Comm'n at 236.
124. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d at 764.
125. Special Committee to Study Commitment Procedures of the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of New York, Mental Illness and Due Process, Report and Recommendations on
Admission to Mental Hospitals under New York Law 78-82 (1962).
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would be possible. If the person's condition and drinking pattern are seri-
ous (i.e., he is, or is likely to become an alcoholic), he should be advised
to enter an appropriate hospital voluntarily for treatment This method
is reflected in the suggestion of the Commission: "The detoxification
center would replace the police station as an initial detention unit for
inebriates. Under the authority of civil legislation, the inebriate would be
brought to this public health facility by the police and detained there
until sober. Thereafter, the decision to continue treatment should be left
to the individual."'1 26
With the alcoholic who has not violated the criminal law and, there-
fore, is not subject to any criminal procedure, civil commitment to a
medical institution would not seem to be warranted. Constitutional prob-
lems would arise in connection with such a program of involuntary com-
mitment.1 7 However, the doctrine of parens patriae, as applied to an
individual who is temporarily helpless, may justify the legality of a short
detention. For an intoxicated person found in a public place but not
charged with dangerous or anti-social conduct, only short detention to
enable him to regain soberness should be permitted.
For the recognized alcoholic who has violated the criminal law, com-
pulsory commitment to a hospital for treatment should be constitutionally
unassailable. The doctrine of parens patrie and, possibly, police power
justify this procedure. The remaining problems are the length of time
during which he may be hospitalized, and the rights to which he is en-
titled during the hospitalization. For the ordinary drunkenness offender,
there is no problem with his criminal responsibility. Medical services
could be rendered to him in the penal institution. A decision to continue
treatment voluntarily after completion of his sentence should be left to
him.
IV. CONCLUiSION
The offense of public intoxication is an offense of strict liability. Achles
reus alone is sufficient for conviction, and inens rea is not a material ele-
ment of the offense. Actus reus presupposes an act which manifests a
certain mental element of the actor. As Holmes pointed out, an act "is
a muscular contraction, and something more. A spasm is not an act. The
contraction of muscles must be willed."'' 2 As a result, even where the
courts treat an offense as creating strict liability, there can be no liability
in the absence of voluntary conduct.
126. See President's Comm'n at 236.
127. Kutner, Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 383
(1962).
128. 0. W. Holmes, The Common Law 54 (1881).
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To label alcoholism as a disease has the effect of making problem
drinking a topic for systematic study rather than a moral issue. It pro-
vides a common ground on which law and medicine can work together
for a solution to the problems involved. However, medical knowledge
has not reached the stage to supplant legal determination of the criminal
responsibility of public drunkenness offenders. Psychiatry has not reached
the point of scientific certainty. Consequently, the disease idea of alco-
holism can supplement, but cannot replace traditional rules of criminal
law concerning criminal responsibility.
Against this framework, it is suggested that the most valuable contri-
butions that psychiatry can offer to law are aids to courts deciding the
question of voluntariness or involuntariness of specific conduct and de-
termining whether an offender needs treatment and the provision of
facilities and services for diagnosis and treatment.
The civil commitment program involves various legal problems. Some
can be solved by careful legislative drafting, but others would funda-
mentally violate the safeguards afforded the individual by the constitu-
tion. Under the existing legal system, it would seem justifiable to establish
involuntary commitment procedures for those alcoholics who are acquitted
by the court on the ground of lack of actus reus in conduct. Short de-
tention of all the drunks, alcoholics, habitual inebriates, or ordinary social
drinkers who occasionally get intoxicated, should be legally and con-
stitutionally permissible. However, long-term compulsory hospitalization
of the individual who has exhibited signs of problem drinking but has not
violated the criminal law would not be constitutional. Although civil
rehabilitation seems desirable, it must operate in such a way as to pre-
serve individual rights and liberties. Voluntary, non-criminal detoxification
and follow-up treatment procedures should be arranged, but they should
conform with the fundamental values embodied in and protected by law.
